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Abstract
We study rebate mechanisms according to which a monopolist selling a product introduces rebates as function of
the volume of buyers. This enables the firm to induce payoff externalities that ordinarily do not exist. The monopoly
firm sells an indivisible good to a mass of consumers with uncertain valuations corresponding to two sources of un-
certainty: a systemic uncertainty corresponding to the realized quality, and an idiosyncratic uncertainty modeling the
diversity of consumers’ tastes. Analyzing the equilibria of the induced global game among the consumers, we show
that introducing positive externality via an increasing aggregate reward program reduces the profit. Using variational
optimization techniques, we identify several key characteristics of the optimal reward program: the optimal solution is
a “full-refund or nothing” policy, fully reimbursing the buyers if the realized quality falls in one of the finitely many
refund-eligible intervals. The number of intervals, though finite, grow unboundedly as consumers’ tastes become less
diverse and valuations concentrate around the true quality. While finding the optimal reward program is in general an
intractable problem, we fully characterize the optimal solution in two important instances: one with constraints on the
reward size and the other with bounds on the rate of change of the reward with sales volume. Despite their simple
and intuitive structures, the corresponding optimal reward programs asymptotically recover the optimal solution. Our
analysis sheds light on the potential role of novel technology-enabled features of crowd-based markets in developing
new revenue management strategies.
Index Terms
Network effect, strategic uncertainty, global games, group buying, variational optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is now well understood that firms selling goods that exhibit network effect achieve gains in their
profit due to (positive) externalities. For such products, the benefit a user derives from consuming the
product is increasing with the number of other users consuming the same product, yielding a utility
higher than its inherent value. New technologies and innovations, smartphone applications (e.g., Viber,
WhatsApp), online games (e.g., Warcraft), social network web sites (e.g., Facebook, Twitter), and online
dating services (e.g., Zoosk, Match.com, OkCupid) are among many examples of products with positive
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2network effects. The economic theory of network externalities has a long history, going back to Farrell
and Saloner (1985); Katz and Shapiro (1986). These works are followed by a series of papers on network
games with strategic complements1 (Ballester et al. (2006); Sundararajan (2007); Galeotti et al. (2010)).
More recently, Candogan et al. (2012); Bloch and Que´rou (2013); Cohen and Harsha (2017); Hu and
Wang (2013) study the effect of network externalities on optimal pricing and revenue management over
networks in a monopoly setting.
Motivated by the operational value of the network effect discussed above, we introduce sales-based
rebate mechanisms as a means of inducing payoff externalities for products with no inherent network
effect. Specifically, we consider a firm offering a product to a continuum of agents with uncertain
valuations. There are two sources of uncertainty in consumers’ valuations: i) a systemic uncertainty
resulting from the uncertainty in the realized quality of the product, and ii) an idiosyncratic uncertainty
resulting from the diversity of consumers’ tastes. The firm induces externality by appending what we
call an aggregate reward program to the offered price. Buyers pay the price when making a purchase
and are paid a reward at the end of the sales period. The reward is designed to be a function of the
ex-post aggregate size of the buyers (sales volume). Upon announcing the reward program, consumers
simultaneously make purchase decisions (e.g. to buy or not) while maximizing their expected payoffs
given the offered price and reward program, their private valuations, and their belief on the sales volume.
The above setup induces a global game (Morris and Shin (1998, 2003); Carlsson and van Damme
(1993)) among the consumers, where heterogeneity of private valuations induces heterogeneous beliefs on
the sales volume at equilibrium. This enables the firm to effectively price-discriminate, offering different
expected net prices at different valuations using a variable reward program. As one of our main findings,
we show that contrary to what one might believe at first, introducing positive externality via an increasing
reward function reduces the seller’s profit. Unlike a fixed posted price, a carefully designed reward
program can induce a higher price in expectation at higher valuations. Finding the optimal reward program,
however, involves solving an infinite dimensional non-concave maximization problem with a continuum
of constraints. While fully solving for the optimal solution in closed form is not possible, we identify
several key characteristics of the optimal reward program using variational optimization techniques. In
particular, we show that the optimal reward program is a “full-refund or nothing” policy which pays back
the full price to buyers if the realized quality lies in one of the finitely-many refund-eligible intervals.
The number of intervals, though finite, grows unboundedly as consumers’ tastes become less diverse and
1Games of strategic complementarities are those in which the best response of each player is increasing in actions of others
(Vives (2005)).
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3valuations concentrate further around the true quality. Moreover, for any number of full-refund intervals,
the expected profit from an optimally-designed reward program approaches that of the no-reward case
in this regime. Given these implications, and as an alternative to the optimal solution, we analytically
characterize the optimal solution in two special cases corresponding to two subspaces of the reward
functions: one with a constraint on the reward size and the other with a constraint on rate of change of
the reward with the sales volume. Despite their simple structures, these two reward programs perform
provably-well when compared to the optimal solution; The former coincides with the optimal solution
when most of the uncertainty in consumers’ valuations comes from the diversity in tastes, while the latter
yields a profit asymptotically approaching the optimal expected profit when uncertainty in valuations is
primarily due to the uncertainty in the quality of the product.
A. Literature Review
This work is closely related to several areas in the revenue management and pricing literature, including
group-buying and quantity discounts. The proposed reward program, however, offers a somewhat different
strategy compared to group-buying schemes. In a group-buying scheme, buyers can receive a discount
if they simultaneously purchase the product as a group. In 2010, Groupon, a major player in group-
buying industry, was named the fastest-growing company in the history of the Web by Forbes (Steiner
(2010)). Despite their stunning early rise, the industry has experienced a downfall over the past few years:
LivingSocial (Groupon’s main competitor), once valued at $6 billion, was recently acquired by Groupon
for $0 (Knowledge@Wharton (2017)). Groupon’s stock value has dropped from a high of more than
$28 in 2011 to around $4 per share today. Amazon Local, one of Groupon’s competitors offering similar
packages, closed down in 2015 (Soper (2015)). Given the ups and downs of the group-buying industry,
the pros and cons of their business model has been debated, discussed, and dissected, yet the future of
group-buying platforms is an uncertain one.
Benefits of group-buying strategies are often pointed out as “economies of networking” and “economies
of scale” in the business press (Mourdoukoutas (2012)). Along the same line, Jing and Xie (2011) suggest
that the key advantage of group-buying lies in fostering Word-of-Mouth: it incentivizes the expert to act
as “sales agents” and to promote the product to novice customers through interpersonal influences. Such
strategies appear more suitable for relatively unknown firms, as was shown in Edelman et al. (2016). In
a related work, Zhang et al. (2016) study group-buying mechanisms by explicitly accounting for both the
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4utility from shopping together with one’s social circle2 as well as the inconvenience cost due to the wait
time, and show that the former usually outweighs the latter. Kauffman and Wang (2001) find evidence
of the positive externality effect on customer bids using customer data from MobShop.com. Selling in
large groups is also advantageous in situations involving scale economies (e.g., in restaurant’s industry)
as large quantities reduce the marginal cost (Monahan (1984); Kohli and Park (1989)).
In this work, our focus is on products with fixed market size and marginal cost. This enables us to
single out the operational value of reward programs through their direct effect on the utilities of the
firm and consumers in absence of scale economies, while setting aside second order effects such as
market expansion via Word-of-Mouth and interpersonal influences. In this setting, our results suggest
that discounting the price as a function of the size of buyers is not a profitable strategy.
Another approach to group-buying and threshold discounting is to view them as means of dealing with
demand uncertainty. Anand and Aron (2003) and Chen and Zhang (2015) use threshold discounting to
find the operative demand regime in a scenario where the seller is uncertain about the demand. Unlike
our setting, however, demand parameters are assumed to be fully known to buyers. Treating the entire
market as a single player with unknown type, where the type determines the operative demand regime,
their results can be closely related to the seminal work of Maskin and Riley (1984) which studies optimal
quantity discounting of a seller in face of a buyer with uncertain type.3 Somewhat closer to our work is
that of Marinesi et al. (2018), where demand uncertainty is present at both ends. A seller with capacity
constraints uses threshold discounting to both signal the market size to buyers and to condition offering
the product during the “slow” season on the market size, hence reducing the supply-demand mismatch.4
As noted by the authors, however, this strategy can potentially reduce the profit if the seller has no
capacity constraint, as assumed in our work.
Another related body of work is the literature on referral reward programs, where the seller uses
monetary rewards to motivate existing buyers to spread product information thus expanding the market
(Biyalogorsky et al. (2001); Aral and Walker (2011); Lobel et al. (2017); Leduc et al. (2017)).5 Although
very similar in nature, group-buying has the advantage of stimulating a larger scale of social interaction as
2See Mangleburg et al. (2004) and the references therein for the influence of the peers on spending more on shopping.
3There are still substantial differences in the assumptions on the type distribution in these works. As a result, while quantity
discounts in Maskin and Riley (1984) are everywhere optimal, threshold discounting strategies may not always outperform
posted fixed prices as noted by the authors in Anand and Aron (2003) and Chen and Zhang (2015).
4Cachon (2004) also uses quantity discounts to encourage early season purchases to reduce the risk due to demand uncertainty.
5Other word of mouth marketing strategies include creating buzz using promotions and frequent zero-pricing (see Campbell
et al. (2017), and Ajorlou et al. (2018) and references therein).
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5it requires information sharing before any transaction takes place (see Jing and Xie (2011) for a detailed
comparison of group-buying and referral reward programs). As stated before, by considering a fixed
market size we set aside the second order beneficial marketing effects of the reward programs, including
the market expansion via social interactions, in our analysis and fully elaborate on the operational value
of such programs resulted from their direct effect on the utilities of the seller and buyers.
To summarize, while firms achieve a growth in their profit for products with an inherent positive
network effect, we articulate that inducing such an effect using an aggregate reward program may reduce
the profit. In particular, for sellers with a established customer base (e.g., Groupon, Amazon, Facebook),
with no capacity constraints and a fixed marginal cost (e.g., many digital goods and services) and uncertain
quality (or average valuation), inducing positive externality (e.g., via group discounting) is harmful to the
profit of the firm. Nevertheless, incentive programs such as group-buying and referral rewards can be still
beneficial due to their effectiveness in fostering word of mouth and social influence, scale economies,
and reducing supply-demand mismatch under capacity constraint in situations discussed in the literature
of group-buying and referral reward programs.
Along with their analytical complexity and operational challenges, technology-driven markets bring a
series of useful features that were not previously available. Our work aims at developing a theory for a
new generation of rebate programs that takes advantage of these new features. We use a simple, stylized
model to highlight the core ideas of our proposed sales-based rebate program, which requires keeping
track of the number of users of a product -a feature easy to implement today (at least for digital goods
and services). Such a feature would be quite out of reach a few years ago.6
II. MODEL
We consider a firm selling an indivisible product to a unit-mass continuum of consumers indexed by
i ∈ [0, 1] at an exogenous market price p. Consumers have private valuations for the product, normally
distributed around an uncertain quality v which reflects the average valuation of the product in the market.
More precisely, we assume that the private valuation of consumer i is of the form vi = v + i, where
i ∼ N(0, σ2 ) represents the heterogeneous idiosyncratic tastes of the consumers, and the quality v is
drawn from a normal distribution v ∼ N(θ, σ2θ) known to both consumers and the firm. It is instructive
to note the two sources of uncertainty in consumers’ valuations: i) a systemic uncertainty coming from
6The closest implementation that we have found is that of “Guaranteed prize pool” poker tournaments in online poker (e.g.,
PokerStars and FullTilt, where the platform (also known as the house) guarantees a certain number of participants for the tourney.
Each player pays a fee to register for the tourney which goes to the prize pool. If the prize pool falls short of the promised
size, then the rest is on the house.
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6the uncertainty in the realized quality (with variance σ2θ ), and ii) an idiosyncratic uncertainty resulting
from the diversity of consumers’ tastes (with variance σ2 ). This results in a total uncertainty of variance
σ2 = σ2 + σ
2
θ and a distribution vi ∼ N(θ, σ2) for consumers’ valuations.
An agent with valuation vi makes a purchase (ai = 1) if the utility of purchase, given by ui = vi− p,
is higher than the utility of not buying (ai = 0), which is normalized to zero. This decision by each
agent induces a sales volume of size a¯(v) = Prob[vi > p|v] = Φ(v−pσ ) for a given realization v of the
quality. The expected sales volume can be written as
Ev[a¯(v)] = Ev[Φ(
v − p
σ
)] = Φ(
θ − p
σ
). (1)
The expected profit of the seller, thus, is given by
Π¯(p) = pEv[a¯(v)] = pΦ(
θ − p
σ
).7 (2)
Assumption 1. The market price p is set so as to maximize the ex-ante expected profit of the seller, and
is given by the unique solution of
p
σ
=
Φ( θ−pσ )
φ( θ−pσ )
, (3)
where σ2 = σ2 + σ
2
θ is the variance of the ex-ante total uncertainty in consumers’ valuations.
8
Our aim here is to study the effect of reward programs on the profit of the seller. The timing of the
actions of agents in the model is as follows: The firm announces a reward program r : [0, 1]→ [0, p] when
launching the product at the market price p, which is assumed to be optimally set as in Assumption 1.
Consumers pay price p to the firm when they buy the product and receive a reward valued at r(a¯) at the
end of the purchase period, where a¯ is the ex-post sales volume.
Upon observing the price and reward program, and given the private valuations and the common public
prior on the quality, agents simultaneously decide whether to purchase or not. The payoff for non-buyers
(ai = 0) is normalized to zero, as before. The payoff of a purchase decision (ai = 1) is updated to
ui = vi + r(a¯)− p, (4)
to account for the reward paid to the buyers. Consumers take actions maximizing their expected payoffs,
7The marginal cost is normalized to zero.
8We assume an optimally set fixed price for the product, in order to purely isolate the effect of the reward program.
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7and as a result set their action as:
ai = 1{Ev[ui|vi, p, r(·)] > 0}. (5)
The utility of the firm offering the reward program r(·) is given by
Π(p, r(·)) = (p− r(a¯))a¯, (6)
where a¯ is the sales volume resulted from the strategies of the consumers and the realized quality v.
We call a reward program profitable if it yields an expected profit higher than the profit in the no-
reward case. A natural question which arises is whether there exists a profitable reward program at all.
One can think of a reward program as a bet between the firm and each consumer whose outcome depends
on the realization of the quality. Therefore, a profitable reward program may seem out of reach, given
the informational “edge” of the consumers over the firm.9
III. PROFITABILITY OF AGGREGATE REWARD PROGRAMS
To clarify the effect of an aggregate reward program, we first start with the full-information case, where
the quality of the product v is perfectly known, i.e., σθ = 0. It is easy to verify that a reward program
in this case works merely as a price discount. To see this, note that given v, consumers can correctly
foresee the sales volume a¯ at equilibrium and subsequently adjust the price and make a purchase if and
only if vi > c = p− r(a¯). Therefore, the offered reward program r(·) works the same way as lowering
the price from p to c = p− r(a¯). This, of course, is clearly not profitable given that p is assumed to be
optimally set when no reward is offered (Assumption 1).
For an uncertain quality (σθ 6= 0), given the dependence of the paid reward on the aggregate size of the
buyers, the offered reward program induces a global game among the consumers; To make a purchase
decision, each consumer needs to form a belief on the valuations of other consumers, as well as a belief
on the beliefs of other consumers on the valuations of others, and so on (cf. Morris and Shin (1998,
2003); Carlsson and van Damme (1993) for the theory of global games). Therefore, the first step in
analyzing the profitability of aggregate reward programs is to characterize the equilibria of the sub-game
among the consumers.
9Besides the common prior on the quality v, each consumer’s valuation provides her with a noisy private observation of v.
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8A. Monotone Bayes-Nash Equilibria of the Consumers’ Subgame
The negligible effect of individual consumers on the aggregate action in continuum models makes
the Bayes Nash equilibria of the game symmetric. We turn our attention here to equilibria in the class
of monotone or threshold strategies. A symmetric, monotone strategy with threshold c is of the form
ai = 1{vi > c}, that is, a consumer makes a purchase if and only if her private valuation is above
c. The existence of such equilibria for the consumers’ subgame can be guaranteed by imposing certain
conditions on the reward program, as we will see later in Lemma 2 and 3.
For a monotone strategy ai = 1{vi > c}, the aggregate size of the buyers for a realization v of the
quality is a¯ = Φ(v−cσ ). Consumer i, with private valuation vi = v + i, updates her belief on the quality
as v|vi ∼ N(τvi + (1− τ)θ, σ2v), where τ = σ
2
θ
σ2+σ
2
θ
and σ2v =
σ2σ
2
θ
σ2+σ
2
θ
. The expected payoff of adoption is
therefore given as
Ev[ui|vi] = vi − p+ Ev|vi [r(Φ(
v − c
σ
))]. (7)
For an equilibrium threshold strategy ai = 1{vi > c} the cutoff agent is indifferent to making a
purchase or not, that is Ev[ui|vi = c] = 0, or
c− p+ Ev|c[r(Φ(
v − c
σ
))] = 0. (8)
We can write the above indifference equation as p = c + rc, where rc = Ev|c[r(Φ(v−cσ ))] is the reward
expected at the cutoff.
Each buyer is charged a “net price” of p− r(Φ(v−cσ )). The expected utility of the firm is thus given as
Ev[Π(p, r(·))] = Ev[(p− r(Φ(v − c
σ
)))Φ(
v − c
σ
)]. (9)
It is more convenient to work with reward as a function of the quality v. Given the one-to-one map
between the quality and sales volume (a¯ = Φ(v−cσ )) for threshold strategies, we define and henceforth
work with rˆ(v) = r(Φ(v−cσ )) in the rest of the paper.
B. Monotone Reward Programs
We can gain some insight into the profitability of a reward program by writing the expected utility of
the firm conditioning on consumers’ valuations instead of the realized quality of the product (as in (9)).
Recall vi ∼ N(θ, σ2), where σ2 = σ2 + σ2θ is the total uncertainty in valuations. The net price expected
by a consumer with valuation vi is p − Ev|vi [rˆ(v)], as already established in deriving (7). Observing
that the net price expected at valuation vi is the same as the expected net price charged by the seller at
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9valuation vi, we obtain
Ev[Π(p, rˆ(v))] =
∫ ∞
c
(p− Ev|vi [rˆ(v)])ψ(vi)dvi
=
∫ ∞
c
(c+ Ev|c[rˆ(v)]− Ev|vi [rˆ(v)])ψ(vi)dvi
= Ev[Π(c, 0)] +
∫ ∞
c
(Ev|c[rˆ(v)]− Ev|vi [rˆ(v)])ψ(vi)dvi, (10)
where ψ(vi) =
φ(
θ−vi
σ
)
σ is the ex-ante pdf of consumers’ valuations in the market, and Ev[Π(c, 0)] is the
expected utility of the firm offering a price c with no reward. The following result follows immediately.
Lemma 1. Suppose the consumers follow an equilibrium strategy of the form ai = 1{vi > c}, given
the joint price-reward program (p, rˆ(·)). Then, Ev[Π(p, rˆ(·))] > Ev[Π(c, 0)] if and only if the ex-ante
expected reward paid per purchase is less than the reward expected at the cutoff, that is,
Ev[rˆ(v)|vi = c] > Ev[rˆ(v)|vi ≥ c], (11)
where
Ev[rˆ(v)|vi ≥ c] =
∫∞
c Ev|vi [rˆ(v)]ψ(vi)dvi∫∞
c ψ(vi)dvi
. (12)
Proof. See the appendix. 
The seller extracts the full surplus from the cutoff agents since the expected net price at cutoff is
the same as their valuation c (recall the indifference equation c = p − rc). Writing the expected profit
of the firm as in (10), we can observe that the extra surplus extracted from buyers with vi > c via
the reward program is the difference in the reward paid at valuation vi and that paid at the cutoff (i.e.,
Ev|c[rˆ(v)] − Ev|vi [rˆ(v)]). From this, it is clear that a reward program that pays higher reward at higher
valuations cannot outperform an offered price c with no reward, and hence cannot be profitable.
We can show the monotonicity of expected rewards for monotone reward programs (see the proof of
Theorem 1). In particular, we can show that for any increasing non-constant reward program rˆ(·) the
expected rewards are strictly increasing with consumers’ valuations. As a result, any increasing reward
function clearly violates the condition in (11), and hence cannot be profitable.
Theorem 1. There exists no profitable increasing reward program.
Proof. See the appendix. 
This result shows that although an inherently existing positive externality yields the seller a free gain
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in the profit, inducing it via an aggregate reward program for a product with no (or weak) network effect
is indeed harmful to the profit. The rationale is that under an increasing reward program buyers with
higher valuations are charged at a lower rate (in expectation), an overtly non-profitable course of action.
A decreasing reward program, on the other hand, charges a higher expected price at valuations above the
cutoff. The offered reward program is hence profitable if the extra surplus extracted from the buyers via
the reward program surpasses the marginal loss in profit resulted from moving the cutoff away from the
optimally set price p.
C. Profitable Aggregate Reward Programs
The existence of profitable reward programs are clearly contingent on the existence of monotone
equilibria for the consumers’ subgame. In what follows, we first derive sufficient conditions on the reward
program for the existence of such equilibria. We then characterize the optimal reward programs under
such conditions. The resultant optimal reward programs turn out to be decreasing, hence simultaneously
ensuring the existence of profitable decreasing reward programs.
A natural approach to certify the existence of monotone equilibria is to make the expected payoffs
of the consumers increasing with their valuations, assuming a monotone symmetric purchase strategy.10
For monotone expected payoffs, the existence of a monotone equilibrium then boils down to finding a
solution for the indifference equation, which is typically easy to verify. We can ensure the monotonicity
of the expected payoffs (in valuations) by either imposing conditions on the spread of the reward (as in
Lemma 2), or its rate of change (as in Lemma 3).
Lemma 2. Let rmin and rmax denote the minimum and maximum reward paid to a buyer under the
reward program rˆ(·). Then, the expected payoff of adoption, assuming a monotone symmetric strategy
for the consumers, is increasing with their valuations if
rmax − rmin ≤
√
2pi
σσ
σθ
.11 (13)
Proof. See the appendix. 
10referred to as the single-crossing property in mechanism design literature.
11We can similarly come up with conditions ensuring the uniqueness of such an equilibrium. However, we postpone this to
a later time because, as we will see in the sequel, the uniqueness condition will be trivial for the class of reward programs that
are of interest.
March 2019 DRAFT
11
Under this assumption on the reward range, the strategy ai = 1{vi > c} is an equilibrium if and only
if the cutoff (vi = c) is indifferent between making a purchase or not, that is Ev[ui|vi = c] = 0, or
c− p+ Ev|c[rˆ(v)] = 0. (14)
The optimal reward program under this assumption is the solution to the following infinite dimensional
optimization problem:
maximize
rˆ:R→[0,p],c∈R
Ev[(p− rˆ(v))Φ(v − c
σ
)], (15)
subject to: (16)
rmax − rmin ≤
√
2piσσ
σθ
, (17)
c+ Ev|c[rˆ(v)] = p. (18)
Exploiting the log-concavity of the normal distribution, we can analytically solve for the optimal reward
program, as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The optimal reward program rˆ∗SC(·) with the spread constraint rmax − rmin ≤
√
2pi σσσθ is
of the form rˆ∗SC(v) = rM × 1{v ≤ vc}, where rM = min(p,
√
2pi σσσθ ), and σ =
√
σ2 + σ
2
θ , and (c, vc)
is the solution of
p =c+ rMΦ(
vc − µc
σv
),
Φ(vc−cσ )
φ( vc−c
σ
)
σ
=
c
1− τrM φ(
vc−µc
σv
)
σv
, (19)
where σv = σσθ√
σ2+σ
2
θ
, τ = σ
2
θ
σ2+σ
2
θ
, and µc = τc+ (1− τ)θ.
Proof. See the appendix. 
The bound
√
2piσσ
σθ
on the reward spread in (13) is only affected by the diversity of tastes and uncertainty
in realized quality, and not the expected quality of the product θ or, equivalently, the price p. This may
result in a reward which is quite insignificant compared to the offered price p. Consequently, the optimal
reward program may perform poorly, especially in regimes where the uncertainty in valuations is primarily
due to the uncertainty in quality of the product and not the diversity in tastes (σσ is small). A potential
remedy is to come up with an alternative subspace of the reward programs (with monotone expected
utilities for consumers) with a better performance in such regimes.
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Lemma 3. Let rˆ : R→ [0, p] be a piece-wise continuously differentiable function with
| d
dv
rˆ(v)| ≤ 1
τ
, (20)
where τ = σ
2
θ
σ2+σ
2
θ
. Then, the expected payoff of adoption, assuming a monotone symmetric threshold
strategy for the consumers, is increasing with their valuations.
Proof. See the appendix. 
We can characterize the optimal reward program within this class of reward programs with rate of
change constraint using generalized Lagrange multipliers for variational optimization problems (Ito and
Kunisch (2008)).
Theorem 3. The optimal reward program rˆ∗RC(·) satisfying the rate of change constraint | ddv rˆ(v)| ≤ 1τ
is of the form
rˆ∗RC(v) =

p, v < vL
p− 1τ (v − vL), vL ≤ v < vH
0, vH ≤ v,
(21)
where (c, vL, vH) is the solution of∫ vH
vL
Φ(w−cσ )
φ( θ−w
σθ
)
σθ
dw
Φ(vH−µcσv )− Φ(
vL−µc
σv
)
=
cφ(θ − c)
1 + Φ(vL−µcσv )− Φ(
vH−µc
σv
)
, (22)
vH − vL = τp, (23)
p = c+
σv
τ
(
(
vH − µc
σv
)Φ(
vH − µc
σv
)− (vL − µc
σv
)Φ(
vL − µc
σv
) + φ(
vH − µc
σv
)− φ(vL − µc
σv
)
)
, (24)
where σv = σσθ√
σ2+σ
2
θ
, τ = σ
2
θ
σ2+σ
2
θ
, and µc = τc+ (1− τ)θ.
Proof. See the appendix. 
How well do the reward programs given by Theorem 2 and 3 perform with respect to the optimal
reward? Can we characterize the optimal reward program and/or its structural properties? We answer
these questions in the next section.
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IV. OPTIMAL SALES-BASED REWARD PROGRAM
We can formulate the problem of finding the optimal reward program as
maximize
rˆ∈L∞(R;[0,p]),c∈R
Ev[(p− rˆ(v))Φ(v − c
σ
)], (25)
subject to: (26)
Ev|vi [rˆ(v)] + vi − p ≥ 0 for vi ≥ c, (27)
Ev|vi [rˆ(v)] + vi − p ≤ 0 for vi ≤ c, (28)
where L∞(R; [0, p]) is the space of bounded measurable functions taking values in [0, p]. Existence of
Lagrange multipliers for this problem can be established using a regularity condition, which basically
requires the linearized approximation of the constraint space around the optimal solution to have a feasible
interior point.12 Denote the optimal cutoff associated with (25) by c∗. One can easily verify that for the
fixed reward rˆ(v) = p − c∗ and c = c∗ all the inequalities are strict and the indifference equation
is satisfied. Since the only nonlinearity in (25) (being the cutoff) is kept unchanged, this verifies the
regularity condition discussed above. Let the Lagrangian be
L(rˆ, c, λ) = Ev[(p− rˆ(v))Φ(v − c
σ
)] +
∫
R
(c+ x+ Ev|vi=c+x[rˆ(v)]− p)dλ(x), (29)
where λ ∈ BV (R) is an upper-semicontinuous function with bounded variation, decreasing for x < 0 and
increasing for x ≥ 0. Denote the optimal solution of (25) with (rˆ∗, c∗).13 The complementary slackness
property requires ∫
R
(c∗ + x+ Ev|vi=c∗+x[rˆ
∗(v)]− p)dλ(x) = 0, (30)
implying that λ(x) can only change value when c∗ + x + Ev|vi=c∗+x[rˆ∗(v)] − p = 0, that is, when a
consumer with valuation vi = c+x is indifferent between making a purchase or not. It is easy to see that
the indifference equation can only admit finitely many solutions x: any such solution should lie in [0, p].
On the other hand, the payoff of consumers is an analytic function of x since Ev|vi [r(v)] is analytic, and
hence can only admit finite number of zeros in [0, p]. Denote the set of such values of vi = c+ x with
12see, e.g., Definition 1.5 in Ito and Kunisch (2008) for the explicit statement of the regularity used here.
13Let X = L1(R, dΦ( v−θ
σθ
)). Existence of a global maximizer follows from the weak∗ compactness of the closed unit sphere
in X∗ = L∞(R) and the continuity of the expected profit in (rˆ, c) ∈ L∞(R; [0, p]) × [0, p] (see the proof of Theorem 4 for
details).
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x ∈ X . Then, we can write the Lagrangian as
L(rˆ, c, λ) = Ev[(p− rˆ(v))Φ(v − c
σ
)] +
∑
x∈X
λˆ(x)(c+ x+ Ev|vi=c+x[rˆ(v)]− p), (31)
where λˆ(x) = λ(x)−λ(x−), with λˆ(x) < 0 for x < 0, and λˆ(x) > 0 for x > 0. Expanding (31), we get
L(rˆ, c, λ) =pΦ(
θ − c
σ
) +
∑
x∈X
λˆ(x)(c+ x− p)
−
∫
R
rˆ(v)(Φ(
v − c
σ
)
φ( θ−vσθ )
σθ
−
∑
x∈X
λˆ(x)
φ(µc+τx−vσv )
σv
)dv. (32)
Optimality conditions can be written as:
∂
∂c
L(rˆ∗, c, λ)|c=c∗ = 0, (33)
L(rˆ∗, c∗, λ) ≥ L(rˆ, c∗, λ), for all rˆ ∈ L∞(R; [0, p]). (34)
Optimal reward program is hence a “full-refund or nothing” policy of the form
rˆ∗(v) = p× 1{g(v) < 0}, (35)
where
g(v) = Φ(
v − c∗
σ
)
φ( θ−vσθ )
σθ
−
∑
x∈X
λˆ(x)
φ(µc+τx−vσv )
σv
. (36)
Using the first order condition for the optimal threshold c∗ in (82) we can find
λˆ(0) =
c∗φ(θ − c∗)
∂
∂ch(0, c)|c=c∗
> 0, (37)
where h(x, c) = c+ x+ Ev|vi=c+x[rˆ(v)]− p.14
Asymptotic behavior of the function g(v) can be seen from
lim
v→∞
g(v)
φ( θ−v
σθ
)
σθ
= 1, lim
v→−∞
g(v)
φ( ¯
µx−v
σv
)
σv
= −λˆ(
¯
x), (38)
14Note that for a primal feasible reward program, ∂
∂x
h(x, c∗) = 0 for every nonzero x ∈ X . This, in turn, yields
∂
∂c
h(x, c)|c=c∗ = 0 for every nonzero x ∈ X .
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where
¯
x = min{x|x ∈ X}. The optimal reward program is of the form
rˆ∗(v) = p×
l∑
j=1
1{wjL ≤ v ≤ wjH}, (39)
with w1L = −∞ if and only if R− ∩X 6= ∅. This means that the optimal reward program is a full-refund
or nothing policy which refunds the full price to a buyer if the realized quality v falls in one of the l
refund-eligible intervals [wjL, w
j
H ], j = 1, . . . , l.
Having only a few refund-eligible intervals in the optimal reward program, or a measurable performance
of such a reward program compared to the optimal one can be quite useful, given the non-concave infinite
dimensional nature of the maximization problem in (25). To bound the number of levels l in the optimal
solution, consider consumer i with valuation vi ∈ [c, p] and let µi = τvi + (1 − τ)θ ∈ [µc, µp] be the
quality expected by this consumer. Denote the set of qualities eligible for a full refund by Vrefund =
∪lj=1[wjL, wjH ]. Suppose that the expected quality µi is not within δ-vicinity of refund eligible qualities,
that is d(Vrefund, µi) > δ, for some δ > 0. It is then easy to see that Ev|vi [rˆ(v)] < 2pΦ(−δσv ). Since i is a
buyer (vi ∈ [c, p]), this requires
vi > p− 2pΦ(−δ
σv
). (40)
Therefore, for any δ > 0 and vi ∈ [c, p− 2pΦ(−δσv )], we should have d(Vrefund, µi) ≤ δ. As a result15
|[µc, µp] \ Vrefund| < 2pτΦ(−δ
σv
) + 2lδ, (41)
for any δ ≥ 0. This imposes an upper bound on the expected profit of a reward program with l full-refund
intervals:
Ev[(p− rˆ(v))Φ(v − c
σ
)] = p
∫
R\Vrefund
Φ(
v − c
σ
)
φ( θ−vσθ )
σθ
dv
< p
∫
R\[µc,µp]
Φ(
v − c
σ
)
φ( θ−vσθ )
σθ
dv +
p√
2piσθ
(2pτΦ(
−δ
σv
) + 2lδ). (42)
Fix the total uncertainty in consumers’ valuations σ2 = σ2θ + σ
2
 . A choice of δ =
√
σv ensures that,
for any number of levels l, the second term in the above upper bound vanishes as σ → 0 (and so does
σv =
σσθ
σ ). The first term, on the other hand, has an asymptotic value of pΦ(
θ−p
σ ), that is the profit of
the no reward case.15 Using this and taking a few simple steps, we can prove the following properties
15See the proof of Theorem 4 for details.
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for the optimal reward program.
Theorem 4. The optimal reward program rˆ∗(·) cast as the solution of the optimization problem in (25)
is a “full-refund or nothing” policy of the form
rˆ∗(v) = p×
l∑
j=1
1{wjL ≤ v ≤ wjH}, (43)
where the intervals [wjL, w
j
H ], j = 1, . . . , l identify the qualities eligible for a refund. Moreover, fixing
the total uncertainty in consumers’ valuations σ2 = σ2θ + σ
2
 , then as σ → 0,
i) the number of refund-eligible intervals l in the optimal reward program tends to infinity.
ii) for any fixed l, the expected profit resulted from the optimal reward program with l full-refund
intervals approaches that of the no reward case.
Proof. See the appendix. 
Unlike the optimal reward program formulated in (25), which is the solution of an infinite dimensional
non-concave maximization problem with a continuum of constraints, the reward programs characterized
in Theorem 2 and 3 have simple structures, can be characterized analytically, and are easy to implement.
To evaluate the performance of these reward programs, however, we need sufficiently tight upper bounds
on the optimal expected profit.
A simple observation is that the expected profit extracted from consumers with valuation vi is capped
with both the price p and vi. This leads to the following upper bound on the expected profit:
ΠH1 =pΦ(
θ − p
σ
) +
∫ p
0
x
φ( θ−xσ )
σ
dx
=pΦ(
θ − p
σ
) + θ(Φ(
θ
σ
)− Φ(θ − p
σ
)) + σ(φ(
θ
σ
)− φ(θ − p
σ
)). (44)
We can also obtain an upper bound on the optimal expected profit by solving a relax version of (25),
in which we only keep the constraint corresponding to the indifference equation.16
16Alternatively, we could use weak duality.
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Lemma 4. Let (c, vc) be the solution of
c =pΦ(
µc − vc
σv
),
Φ(vc−cσ )
φ( vc−c
σ
)
σ
=
c
1− τpφ(
vc−µc
σv
)
σv
, (45)
where σv = σσθ√
σ2+σ
2
θ
, τ = σ
2
θ
σ2+σ
2
θ
, and µc = τc + (1 − τ)θ. Then the expected profit under the optimal
reward program (that is, the solution to (25)) cannot exceed the expected profit resulted from the reward
function rˆ(v) = p× 1{v < vc} and cutoff c, given by
ΠH2 = p
∫ ∞
vc
Φ(
v − c
σ
)
φ( θ−vσθ )
σθ
dv. (46)
Proof. See the appendix. 
We use the upper bound ΠH = min(ΠH1 ,Π
H
2 ) for the optimal expected profit to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the reward programs given by Theorem 2 and 3. This upper bound, along with the expected
profit resulted from the rˆ∗SC(·) and rˆ∗RC(·) are plotted in Figure 1 for a sample choice of θ, and various
allocations of the total uncertainty in consumers’ valuations σ2 = σ2θ + σ
2
 between the two sources
of uncertainty (that is, diversity in tastes and uncertainty in the realized quality). When most of the
uncertainty in valuations comes from the diversity in tastes, the expected profit resulted from rˆ∗SC(·)
coincides with the upper bound on the expected profit, certifying the optimality of rˆ∗SC(·) and tightness
of the upper bound in this regime. On the other hand, as σ → 0, that is the uncertainty in valuations
is primarily due to the uncertainty in the quality, the expected profit from rˆ∗RC(·) approaches the upper
bound on the expected profit, implying asymptotic optimality of rˆ∗RC(·) as σ → 0.
Theorem 5. Fix the total uncertainty in consumers’ valuations σ2 = σ2θ + σ
2
 . Then,
i) for σσθ ≥
p√
2piσ
, the spread-constrained reward program rˆ∗SC(·) characterized in Theorem 2 is
optimal. That is, rˆ∗SC(·) is also the solution to the variational optimization problem in (25).
ii) the rate-constrained reward program rˆ∗RC(·) characterized in Theorem 3 is asymptotically optimal,
in the sense that
lim
σ→0
Ev[Π(p, rˆ∗RC(v))]
Ev[Π(p, rˆ∗(v))]
= 1, (47)
where rˆ∗(v) is the optimal reward program formulated in (25).
Proof. See the appendix. 
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Fig. 1. The expected profit for the spread-constrained (rˆ∗SC(·)) and rate-constrained (rˆ∗RC(·)) reward programs characterized
in Theorem 2 and 3, versus the upper bound on the optimal expected profit (ΠH ) and the expected profit of the no reward case
(Ev[Π(p, 0)]), for a sample choice of θ = 5 and total uncertainty σ normalized to 1. The resultant optimal price for the no
reward case is p = 3.91.
One important point that should be made here is that the optimal rate-constrained reward program
of Theorem 3, which is in the form of a saturated linear function with the range [0, p] should not be
attributed to the limiting behavior of the sequence of optimal reward programs {rˆ∗σ} as σ → 0. Although
Theorem 4 establishes that the number of levels in rˆ∗σ goes to infinity as σ → 0, these functions are
“full-refund or nothing” programs taking only values in {0, p}. Therefore, the sequence of optimal reward
programs {rˆ∗σ}, as σ → 0, do not converge to rˆ∗RC , and may not even be convergent at all.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Motivated by the extra gain in the profit for products and services inherently exhibiting network effect,
we ask whether inducing network externality via a reward policy as a function of the sales volume
is beneficial to a firm selling a product with no network effects. To tackle this question, we consider a
seller offering an indivisible product to a mass of consumers with uncertain valuations. The uncertainty in
valuations is a combination of systemic uncertainty in the realized quality and an idiosyncratic uncertainty
resulting from diversity of consumer tastes and preferences. Heterogeneous beliefs on sales volume
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resulting from the heterogeneity of valuations enables the firm to discriminate net prices over consumers’
valuations. As one of our main results, we show that while firms can often gain when a product naturally
exhibits positive network effect, artificially inducing such an effect using an aggregate reward program
could reduce the profit. Nevertheless, incentive programs such as group-buying and referral rewards can be
still beneficial due to their effectiveness in fostering word of mouth and social influence, scale economies,
and reducing supply-demand mismatch under capacity constraint in situations discussed in the literature
of group-buying and referral reward programs. Using a global games setting and variational optimization
techniques, we identify several key characteristics of the optimal reward program formulated as the
solution to an infinite dimensional non-concave maximization problem with a continuum of constraints.
The optimal reward program is a “full-refund or nothing” policy, fully reimbursing buyers if and when
the realized quality lies in one of the finitely many refund-eligible intervals. As consumers’ tastes become
less diverse and valuations concentrate further around the quality, the number of refund-eligible intervals
grows unboundedly. Moreover, in this regime, the performance of the optimal reward program for any
finite number of levels degrades to utility of the no-reward case. As an alternative, we propose and
characterize the optimal solutions when the reward policy lies in a particular subspace of range-constrained
and rate-constrained reward programs, and evaluate their performance against the optimal solution. In
particular, we show that the optimal range-constrained program coincides with the optimal solution when
most of the uncertainty in consumers’ valuations comes from the diversity in tastes, while the optimal
rate-constrained program performs asymptotically as well as the optimal solution when uncertainty in
valuations is primarily due to the uncertainty in the quality of the product.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. Proof follows directly from (10). 
Proof of Theorem 1. We first prove the following lemma on the monotonicity of expected rewards for
monotone reward programs.
Lemma 5. Suppose the consumers follow a threshold strategy of the form ai = 1{vi > c}. Then, for
any increasing non-constant reward program r(·) the expected rewards of the consumers are strictly
increasing with their valuations. In other words,
v1 > v2 ⇒ Ev|v1 [rˆ(v)] > Ev|v2 [rˆ(v)]. (48)
Similarly, the expected rewards are decreasing with consumers’ valuations for any decreasing reward
program.
Proof. Recall that v|x ∼ N(τx+ (1− τ)θ, σ2v), where τ = σ
2
θ
σ2+σ
2
θ
and σ2v =
σ2σ
2
θ
σ2+σ
2
θ
. Therefore,
Ev|x[rˆ(v)] =
∫ ∞
−∞
rˆ(v)
φ(v−τx−(1−τ)θσv )
σv
dv
=
∫ ∞
−∞
rˆ(v + τx)
φ(v−(1−τ)θσv )
σv
dv, (49)
from which the lemma immediately follows.
Based on the above lemma, any increasing non-constant reward program violates condition (11) in
Lemma 1, and hence cannot be profitable. 
Proof of Lemma 2. For ∂∂viEv[ui|vi] ≥ 0 to hold, it suffices to have | ∂∂viEv|vi [rˆ(v)]| ≤ 1. Let µi =
τvi + (1− τ)θ. Then,
∂
∂vi
Ev|vi [rˆ(v)] = Ev|vi [rˆ(v)
−(v − µi)
σv
∂
∂vi
(
v − µi
σv
)]
=
τ
σv
Ev|vi [rˆ(v)
(v − µi)
σv
]. (50)
Using this, it is easy to see that
| ∂
∂vi
Ev|vi [rˆ(v)]| ≤
τ
σv
(rmax − rmin)
∫ ∞
0
xφ(x)dx =
τ√
2piσv
(rmax − rmin). (51)
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Therefore, if rmax − rmin ≤
√
2piσv
τ =
√
2pi σσσθ then
∂
∂vi
Ev[ui|vi] ≥ 0, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 2. WLOG, we normalize the total uncertainty in consumers’ valuations to 1, that is,
we assume σ2 = σ2 + σ
2
θ = 1. Let the Lagrangian be
L(rˆ, c, λ) = Ev[Π(p, rˆ(v))]− λ(p− c− Ev|c[rˆ(v)]). (52)
Recalling that Ev[Π(p, rˆ(v))] =
∫∞
c (p− Ev|vi [rˆ(v)])ψ(vi)dvi, we can write the first order condition for
optimal cutoff c as
0 = −(p− Ev|c[rˆ(v)])ψ(c)− λ(−1 +
τ
σv
Ev|c[(
µc − v
σv
)rˆ(v)]), (53)
which yields
λ =
cφ(θ − c)
1− τσvEv|c[(
µc−v
σv
)rˆ(v)]
. (54)
To find the optimal reward paid at each realization v of the quality, we use Π(p, rˆ(v)) = (p −
rˆ(v))Φ(v−cσ ) to find the weight of rˆ(v) in the Lagrangian L:
− Φ(v − c
σ
)
φ(v−θσθ )
σθ
+ λ
φ(v−µcσv )
σv
. (55)
Let vc be a zero of (55). Using the identity
φ( vc−µc
σv
)
σv
φ( vc−θ
σθ
)
σθ
=
φ( vc−c
σ
)
σ
φ( θ−c√
σ2+σ
2
θ
)
√
σ2+σ
2
θ
, (56)
and the assumption σ2 + σ
2
θ = 1, we can reach at
λ
φ(θ − c) =
Φ(vc−cσ )
φ( vc−c
σ
)
σ
, (57)
showing the uniqueness of vc given the log-concavity of the normal distribution. It then follows that, for
the optimal reward program, rˆ(v) = rmax for v < vc and rˆ(v) = rmin for v ≥ vc. Also, rmax−rmin = rM ,
where we recall that rM = min(p,
√
2pi σσσθ ). Noting that Ev|c[
µc−v
σv
] = 0, first order optimality condition
for c given in (54) is insensitive to rmin, and combined with (57) leads to
λ
φ(θ − c) =
Φ(vc−cσ )
φ( vc−c
σ
)
σ
=
c
1− τσv rMφ(
vc−µc
σv
)
. (58)
The reward rmin works as a discount as it is paid at all values of v. Note that although no discount
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is profitable when there is no reward (p is the optimal price with no reward), this does not necessarily
imply rmin = 0 when we allow for a joint reward program. Using (55) the total weight of rmin in L is
−Φ(θ − c) + λ. Therefore,
rmin =

0, λ < Φ(θ − c)
p− rM , λ > Φ(θ − c)
∈ [0, p− rM ], λ = Φ(θ − c).
(59)
We claim, however, that having a discount is still not profitable when a joint reward is allowed. For
the case p ≤ √2pi σσσθ , we have rM = min(p,
√
2pi σσσθ ) = p yielding rmin = 0 from (59). Therefore,
we only need to deal with the case where rM =
√
2pi σσσθ < p. We prove rmin = 0 by showing that
λ < Φ(θ − c). Suppose (by contradiction) that λ ≥ Φ(θ − c). Then,
Φ(θ − c)
φ(θ − c) ≤
λ
φ(θ − c) =
Φ(vc−cσ )
φ( vc−c
σ
)
σ
=
c
1−√2piφ(vc−µcσv )
. (60)
This clearly requires vc−cσ ≥ θ − c. This, combined with the identity
vc − c
σ
= σ(θ − c) + σθ(vc − µc
σv
), (61)
implies that
θ − c ≤ vc − c
σ
≤ 1 + σ
σθ
(
vc − µc
σv
). (62)
On the other hand, using Φ(θ−c)φ(θ−c) ≥ Φ(θ−p)φ(θ−p) = p which follows from the optimality of p, we can find
λ
φ(θ − c) =
c
1−√2piφ(vc−µcσv )
≥ c+ rMΦ(vc − µc
σv
) ≥ rMΦ(
vc−µc
σv
)√
2piφ(vc−µcσv )
. (63)
Comparing (60) and (63), we can observe that
Φ( vc−c
σ
)
φ( vc−c
σ
)
≥ Φ(
vc−µc
σv
)
φ( vc−µc
σv
)
, yielding vc−cσ ≥
vc−µc
σv
. Incorporating
in (61), we get
vc − µc
σv
≤ vc − c
σ
≤ 1 + σθ
σ
(θ − c). (64)
One immediate consequence of (62) and (64) is that θ − c, vc−µcσv , vc−cσ ≥ 0.
We next present the following useful lemma.
Lemma 6. Let 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ c ≤ d be such that a2 + d2 = b2 + c2. Then,
Φ(a)
φ(a)
× Φ(d)
φ(d)
≤ Φ(b)
φ(b)
× Φ(c)
φ(c)
. (65)
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Proof. This easily follows from the log-concavity of Φ(
√
x) and that φ(a)φ(d) = φ(b)φ(c).
Applying the above lemma, we can reach at
Φ(vc−cσ )
φ( vc−c
σ
)
σ
× Φ(
|vc−θ|
σθ
)
φ( |vc−θ|
σθ
)
σθ
≤ Φ(θ − c)
φ(θ − c) ×
Φ(vc−µcσv )
φ( vc−µc
σv
)
σv
. (66)
From (60),
Φ( vc−c
σ
)
φ(
vc−c
σ
)
σ
≥ Φ(θ−c)φ(θ−c) , and hence,
Φ(vc−µcσv )
φ( vc−µc
σv
)
σv
≥ Φ(
|vc−θ|
σθ
)
φ( |vc−θ|
σθ
)
σθ
≥
√
pi
2
σθ. (67)
Therefore,
Φ(vc−µcσv )
φ(vc−µcσv )
≥ 1
σ
√
pi
2
. (68)
Using this in (63), we get
p ≥ c+ rMΦ(vc − µc
σv
) ≥ 1
σθ
√
pi
2
≥
√
pi
2
, (69)
putting p and hence θ in the regime θ ≥ p ≥√pi2 . Another useful inequality can be obtained using the
log-convexity of the function h(x) = Φ(θ−x)xφ(θ−x) for x ∈ [0, p]:
Φ(θ − c)
cφ(θ − c) ≥ e
(p−c)( 2
p
+θ−p) ≥ erMΦ( vc−µcσv )( 2p+θ−p). (70)
Let y := vc−µcσv . Incorporating θ − c ≥ p− c ≥ rMΦ(y) in (62), we can obtain
σ ≤ (1 + σ)y√
2piΦ(y)
≤ 2y√
2piΦ(y)
, (71)
which along with (68) leads to
y
φ(y)
≥ pi
2
, (72)
requiring y > 12 . Finally, (70) and (60), along with the fact that
2
p + θ− p > 32 for θ ≥
√
pi
2 and optimal
price p = Φ(θ−p)φ(θ−p) , we can show
1
1−√2piφ(y) ≥ e
3
√
pi
2
σ√
1−σ2
Φ(y)
. (73)
With a bit of manipulation, we can verify that the above cannot hold for y > 12 and σ ≥
√
pi
2
φ(y)
Φ(y) . This
completes the proof of λ < Φ(θ − c), implying that rmin = 0.
The last point to be made is about the uniqueness of the equilibrium threshold strategy for the subgame
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among the consumers under the optimal reward program. This is important, as in case of multiple
equilibria seller cannot predict the purchase behavior of the consumers. More generally, we can show
the uniqueness of the cutoff c for any decreasing reward program r(Φ(v−cσ )). To prove, we write the
indifference equation as
p = c+ Ev|c[r(Φ(
v − c
σ
))]
= c+ Ev|p[r(Φ(
v − (1− τ)c− τp
σ
))], (74)
where the second equality follows from combining v|c ∼ N(τc+ (1− τ)θ, σ2v) and v|p ∼ N(τp+ (1−
τ)θ, σ2v). It is easy to see that the RHS in (74) is strictly increasing in c, implying the uniqueness of c.

Proof of Lemma 3. Similar to the proof of Lemma 2, it suffices to show that | ∂∂viEv|vi [rˆ(v)]| ≤ 1. This
immediately follows from
Ev|vi [rˆ(v)] =
∫
R
rˆ(v)
φ(v−µiσv )
σv
dv
=
∫
R
rˆ(v + µi)
φ( vσv )
σv
dv, (75)
noting that | ∂∂vi rˆ(v + µi)| ≤ 1τ
∂µi
∂vi
= 1. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Again and WLOG, we normalize the total uncertainty in consumers’ valuations to
1, that is, we assume σ2 = σ2 + σ
2
θ = 1. Denote with PC(R; [a, b]) the space of piecewise continuous
functions from R to [a, b]. Then, ddv rˆ(v) = −u(v) for some u ∈ PC(R; [− 1τ , 1τ ]), and
rˆ(v) = r0 −
∫ v
−∞
u(w)dw, (76)
where r0 := r(a¯(0)) = rˆ(−∞). We can formulate the problem of finding the optimal reward program as
maximize
u∈PC(R;[− 1
τ
, 1
τ
]),c,r0∈R
Ev[Π(p, rˆ(v))], (77)
subject to: (78)
0 ≤ rˆ(v) ≤ p, for all v ∈ R, (79)
c+ Ev|c[rˆ(v)] = p. (80)
The existence of Lagrange multipliers for this problem can be established using a regularity condition,
which basically requires the linearized approximation of the constraint space around the optimal solution
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to have a feasible interior point (see, e.g., Definition 1.5 in Ito and Kunisch (2008) for the explicit
statement of the regularity used here). Denote the optimal cutoff associated with (77) by c∗. One can
easily verify that for rˆ = p− c∗ and c = c∗ all the inequalities are strict and the indifference equation is
satisfied. Since the only nonlinearity in (77) (that is, cutoff) is kept unchanged, this verifies the regularity
condition discussed above. Let the Lagrangian be
L(u, r0, c, λ, µ1, µ2) =Ev[Π(p, rˆ(v))] + λ(c+ Ev|c[rˆ(v)]− p)
+
∫
R
rˆ(v)dµ1(v) +
∫
R
(p− rˆ(v))dµ2(v), (81)
where λ ∈ R, and µ1, µ2 ∈ BV (R) are increasing upper-semicontinuous functions with bounded variation
vanishing at +∞. Denote the optimal solution of (77) with (u∗, r∗0, c∗) and the resulting optimal reward
with rˆ∗(·). Optimality conditions given by Lagrange theorem are then
∂
∂c
L(u∗, r∗0, c, λ, µ1, µ2)|c=c∗ = 0, (82)
L(u∗, r∗0, c
∗, λ, µ1, µ2) ≥ L(u, r∗0, c∗, λ, µ1, µ2), for all u ∈ PC(R; [−
1
τ
,
1
τ
]), (83)
L(u∗, r∗0, c
∗, λ, µ1, µ2) ≥ L(u∗, r0, c∗, λ, µ1, µ2), for all r0 ∈ R, (84)
and the complementary slackness property requires∫
R
rˆ∗(v)dµ1(v) =0,∫
R
(p− rˆ∗(v))dµ2(v) =0, (85)
implying that µ1(v) and µ2(v) can only change when rˆ is on the boundary.
Integration by part for each term in RHS of (81) using ddv rˆ(v) = −u(v), we can recast the Lagrangian
as
L(u, r0, c, λ, µ1, µ2) =(p− r0)Φ(θ − c) +
∫
R
u(v)
∫ +∞
v
Φ(
w − c
σ
)
φ( θ−wσθ )
σθ
dwdv (86)
+ λ(c− p+ r0 −
∫
R
u(v)Φ(
µc − v
σv
)dv)
+
∫
R
u(v)µ1(v)dv −
∫
R
u(v)µ2(v)dv − r0µ01 − (p− r0)µ02, (87)
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where µ01 = µ1(−∞) and µ02 = µ2(−∞). Regrouping the terms, we get
L(u, r0, c, λ, µ1, µ2) =(p− r0)Φ(θ − c) + λ(c− p+ r0)− r0µ01 − (p− r0)µ02
+
∫
R
u(v)(G(v) + µ1(v)− µ2(v))dv, (88)
where
G(v) =
∫ +∞
v
Φ(
w − c
σ
)
φ( θ−wσθ )
σθ
dw − λΦ(µc − v
σv
). (89)
It is easy to see that
∂
∂vG(v)
φ(µc−v
σv
)
σv
= λ− Φ(
v−c
σ
)
φ( v−c
σ
)
σ
φ(θ − c), (90)
which is a decreasing function of v, thus having a unique root vc for λ > 0 and no root otherwise. This
implies that G(v) is increasing for v < vc and decreasing for v ≥ vc, where vc is the unique solution of
λ
φ(θ − c) =
Φ(v−cσ )
φ( v−c
σ
)
σ
, (91)
for λ > 0, and vc = −∞ if λ ≤ 0.
From the optimality condition (82) and complementary slackness property (85), we can obtain
u∗(v) =

1
τ , G(v) + µ1(v)− µ2(v) > 0
− 1τ , G(v) + µ1(v)− µ2(v) < 0
0, G(v) + µ1(v)− µ2(v) = 0.
(92)
Next, we claim that G(v) + µ1(v) − µ2(v) ≥ 0 for all v ∈ R. Suppose, by contradiction, that G(v0) +
µ1(v0)−µ2(v0) < 0 for some v0 ≥ vc (the case v0 < vc is similar). Using the fact that µ2(v) is increasing
and µ1(v) is fixed while off the boundary (i.e., when rˆ∗(v) > 0), and that G(v) is decreasing for v ≥ vc,
(92) requires the optimal reward to increase17 at the fixed rate of 1τ for v ≥ v0, hence eventually violating
the constraint rˆ∗(v) ≤ p. If v0 < vc, a similar argument shows that the resulting optimal solution violates
rˆ∗(v) ≥ 0 at some v < v0.
This proves that G(v)+µ1(v)−µ2(v) ≤ 0 for all v ∈ R. Therefore, while off the boundary the optimal
reward decreases at the fixed rate of 1τ . The optimal reward stays at rˆ
∗(v) = p for v ≤ vL for some
17Recall that ∂
∂v
rˆ∗(v) = −u∗(v).
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vL ≤ vc and at rˆ∗(v) = 0 for v ≥ vH for some vH ≥ vc. Note that to satisfy G(v) + µ1(v)− µ2(v) = 0
for v ≤ vL (v ≥ vH ), µ2 (µ1) has to increase (increase)18 at the same rate at which G(v) increases
(decreases) for v ≤ vL (v ≥ vH ). This also enforces r∗0 = p. In summary,
u∗(v) =

1
τ , vL ≤ v ≤ vH
0, otherwise,
(93)
where,
G(vL) + µ
0
1 = 0,
G(vH) + µ
0
1 = 0,
vH − vL = pτ. (94)
(95)
Evaluating G(v) + µ1(v)− µ2(v) = 0 at v = −∞, we get
µ01 − µ02 − λ+ Φ(θ − c) = 0, (96)
hence satisfying optimality condition for r∗0 given by (82), since this zeros the coefficient of r∗0 in (86).
As for the optimal cutoff, given that
∂
∂c
L(u∗, r∗0, λ, µ1, µ2) = −cφ(θ − c) + λ(1 +
∂
∂c
Ev|c[r∗(v)]), (97)
we can reach at
λ =
c∗φ(θ − c∗)
1 + Φ(vL−µ
∗
c
σv
)− Φ(vH−µ∗cσv )
. (98)
Putting (94), (98), and the indifference equation for cutoff together we can solve for the optimal reward
program as given in Theorem 3. 
Proof of Theorem 4. Most of the proof is given above the theorem in the body of the paper, so we only
fill in the gaps here:
Existence of an optimal reward program: Finding the optimal reward program as posed in (25) involves
maximizing the expected profit of the seller over rˆ ∈ L∞(R; [0, p]), that is the closed half-sphere of
radius p in L∞(R), and c ∈ [0, p]. L∞(R; [0, p]) is weak∗ compact, according to Alaoglu’s theorem (see,
18Note the sign of µ1 vs. µ2.
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e.g., Luenberger (1997), Page 128). To prove the existence of a global maximizer for (25), it thus suffices
to show the continuity of Ev[(p− rˆ(v))Φ(v−cσ )] in (c, rˆ). Continuity of Ev[(p− rˆ(v))Φ(v−cσ )] is apparent
from
|Ev[(p− rˆn(v))Φ(v − cn
σ
)− (p− rˆ(v))Φ(v − c
σ
)]| ≤ φ(0)
σ
|cn − c|+ |Ev[(rˆn(v)− rˆ(v))Φ(v − c
σ
)]|
≤ φ(0)
σ
|cn − c|+ Ev[|rˆn(v)− rˆ(v)|]. (99)
Upper bound on the expected profit for the optimal reward program with l full-refund eligible intervals:
Argument above (41) states that for any δ > 0 and vi ∈ [c, p−2pΦ(−δσv )], we should have d(Vrefund, µi) ≤
δ. If vi ∈ [c, p− 2pΦ(−δσv )], then µi ∈ [µc, µp− 2τpΦ(−δσv )]. The mass of the qualities outside Vrefund and
within its δ-vicinity is upper-bounded by 2lδ given that Vrefund is the union of l intervals. As a result,
|[µc, µp] \ Vrefund| < 2pτΦ(−δ
σv
) + 2lδ, (100)
for any δ ≥ 0, which can be used to obtain an upper bound on the optimal profit as:
Ev[(p− rˆ(v))Φ(v − c
σ
)] < p
∫
R\[µc,µp]
Φ(
v − c
σ
)
φ( θ−vσθ )
σθ
dv +
p√
2piσθ
(2pτΦ(
−δ
σv
) + 2lδ). (101)
Fix the total uncertainty in consumers’ valuations σ2 = σ2θ + σ
2
 . A choice of δ =
√
σv ensures that,
for any number of levels l, the second term in the above upper bound vanishes as σ → 0 (and so does
σv =
σσθ
σ ). As for the first term,∫
R\[µc,µp]
Φ(
v − c
σ
)
φ( θ−vσθ )
σθ
dv < Φ(
θ − µp
σθ
) +
1√
2piσθ
∫ µc
−∞
Φ(
v − c
σ
)dv
< Φ(
θ − µp
σθ
) +
σ√
2piσθ
(σ(θ − c)Φ(σ(θ − c)) + φ(σ(θ − c))), (102)
which is asymptotically upper-bounded by Φ( θ−pσ ) as σ → 0. This, along with (101) shows that the
expected profit for the optimal reward with l full-refund intervals approaches that of the no reward case
(that is, pΦ( θ−pσ )) as σ → 0. To complete the proof, we only need to show that the optimal reward
program yields a nonzero gain over the optimal no reward as σ → 0. This is immediate, comparing
the upper-bound ΠH1 in (44) with the optimal no reward profit, and that the expected profit from rˆ
∗
RC(·)
approaches ΠH1 as σ → 0. 
Proof of Lemma 4. Choosing λ(x) = λ0 × 1{x ≤ 0} in (29), we get the Lagrangian for the relaxed
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problem in which we drop all the constraints except for the indifference equation:
L(rˆ, c, λ) = Ev[(p− rˆ(v))Φ(v − c
σ
)] + λ0(c+ Ev|c[rˆ(v)]− p). (103)
Recalling the identity
Ev[(p− rˆ(v))Φ(v − c
σ
)] =
∫ ∞
c
(p− Ev|vi [rˆ(v)])
φ( θ−viσ )
σ
dvi, (104)
we can write the first order condition for optimal cutoff c as
0 = −(p− Ev|c[rˆ(v)])
φ( θ−cσ )
σ
− λ0(−1 + τ
σv
Ev|c[(
µc − v
σv
)rˆ(v)]), (105)
which yields
λ0 =
c
φ( θ−c
σ
)
σ
1− τσvEv|c[(
µc−v
σv
)rˆ(v)]
. (106)
We can characterize the optimal rˆ(·), similar to Theorem 2, by looking at the weight of rˆ(v) in (103),
which is −Φ(v−cσ )
φ( v−θ
σθ
)
σθ
+ λ0
φ( v−µc
σv
)
σv
. Using a similar approach, this leads to rˆ∗(v) = p × 1{v < vc},
where vc is the unique solution of
λ0
φ( θ−c
σ
)
σ
=
Φ(vc−cσ )
φ( vc−c
σ
)
σ
. (107)
The optimal expected profit for the relaxed problem is thus
Ev[(p− rˆ∗(v))Φ(v − c
σ
)] = p
∫ ∞
vc
Φ(
v − c
σ
)
φ( θ−vσθ )
σθ
dv. (108)
The proof is now complete on noting that the optimal profit for the relaxed problem serves as an upper
bound on the optimal profit for the original problem. 
Proof of Theorem 5. i) When σσθ ≥
p√
2piσ
, the optimal solution to the relaxed problem characterized in
Lemma 4 coincides with the optimal spread-constrained reward program characterized in Theorem 3,
making them both optimal.
ii) We prove this by showing that the expected profit resulted from rˆ∗RC(·) approaches the upper bound
ΠH1 as σ → 0, proving the asymptotic convergence of both to the optimal expected profit. Using the
characterization of rˆ∗RC(·) in Theorem 3, we can show that as σ → 0, then c → 0, vL → 0, vH → p.
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On the other hand, Ev|vi [rˆ∗RC(v)]→ rˆ∗RC(vi) as σ → 0. As a result,
Ev[Π(p, rˆ∗RC(v))]→
∫ ∞
0
(p− rˆ∗RC(vi))
φ( θ−viσ )
σ
dvi →
∫ p
0
vi
φ( θ−viσ )
σ
dvi + pΦ(
θ − p
σ
),
(109)
which is the same as the upper bound ΠH1 given by (44). 
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